IT IS a miserable state of mind, to have few
things to desire, and many things to fear; and
yet that commonly is the case of kings; who, being
at the highest, want matter of desire, which makes
their minds more languishing; and have many rep-
resentations of perils and shadows, which makes
their minds the less clear. And this is one reason
also, of that effect which the Scripture speaketh of,
That the king's heart is inscrutable. For multitude
of jealousies, and lack of some predominant de-
sire, that should marshal and put in order all the
rest, maketh any man's heart, hard to find or
sound. Hence it comes likewise, that princes many
times make themselves desires, and set their hearts
upon toys; sometimes upon a building; sometimes
upon erecting of an order; sometimes upon the ad-
vancing of a person; sometimes upon obtaining
excellency in some art, or feat of the hand; as Nero
for playing on the harp, Domitian for certainty
of the hand with the arrow, Commodus for play-
ing at fence, Caracalla for driving chariots, and
the like. This seemeth incredible, unto those that
know not the principle, that the mind of man, is
more cheered and refreshed by profiting in small
things, than by standing at a stay, in great. We see
also that kings that have been fortunate conquer-
ors, in their first years, it being not possible for
them to go forward infinitely, but that they must
have some check, or arrest in their fortunes, turn
in their latter years to be superstitious, and melan-
choly; as did Alexander the Great; Diocletian; and
in our memory, Charles the Fifth; and others: for
he that is used to go forward, and findeth a stop,
falleth out of his own favor, and is not the thing
he was.
To speak now of the true temper of empire, it is
a thing rare and hard to keep; for both temper, and
distemper, consist of contraries. But it is one thing,
to mingle contraries, another to interchange them.
The answer of Apollonius to Vespasian, is full of
excellent instruction. Vespasian asked him, What
was Nero's overthrow? He answered, Nero could
touch and tune the harp well; but in government,
sometimes he used to wind the pins too high, some-
times to let them down too low. And certain it is,
that nothing destroyeth authority so much, as the
unequal and untimely interchange of power
pressed too far, and relaxed too much.
This is true, that the wisdom of all these latter
times, in princes' affairs, is rather fine deliveries,
and shiftings of dangers and mischiefs, when they
are near, than solid and grounded courses to keep
them aloof. But this is but to try masteries with
fortune. And let men beware, how they neglect
and suffer matter of trouble to be prepared; for no
man can forbid the spark, nor tell whence it may
come. The difficulties in princes' business are many
and great; but the greatest difficulty, is often in
their own mind. For it is common with princes
(saith Tacitus) to will contradictories, Sunt pler-
umque regum voluntates vehementes, et inter se
contrariae. For it is the solecism of power, to think
to command the end, and yet not to endure the
mean.
Kings have to deal with their neighbors, their
wives, their children, their prelates or clergy, their
nobles, their second-nobles or gentlemen, their
merchants, their commons, and their men of war;
and from all these arise dangers, if care and cir-
cumspection be not used.
First for their neighbors; there can no general
rule be given (for occasions are so variable), save
one, which ever holdeth, which is, that princes do
keep due sentinel, that none of their neighbors do
ever grow so (by increase of territory, by embrac-
ing of trade, by approaches, or the like), as they
become more able to annoy them, than they were.
And this is generally the work of standing coun-
sels, to foresee and to hinder it. During that trium-
virate of kings, King Henry the Eighth of England,
Francis the First King of France, and Charles the
Fifth Emperor, there was such a watch kept, that
none of the three could win a palm of ground, but
the other two would straightways balance it,
either by confederation, or, if need were, by a war;
and would not in any wise take up peace at inter-
est. And the like was done by that league (which
Guicciardini saith was the security of Italy) made
between Ferdinando King of Naples, Lorenzius
Medici, and Ludovicus Sforza, potentates, the one
of Florence, the other of Milan. Neither is the opin-
ion of some of the Schoolmen, to be received, that a
war cannot justly be made, but upon a precedent
injury or provocation. For there is no question, but
a just fear of an imminent danger, though there be
no blow given, is a lawful cause of a war.
For their wives; there are cruel examples of
them. Livia is infamed, for the poisoning of her
husband; Roxalana, Solyman's wife, was the
destruction of that renowned prince, Sultan Mus-
tapha, and otherwise troubled his house and suc-
cession; Edward the Second of England, his queen,
had the principal hand in the deposing and mur-
der of her husband. This kind of danger, is then to
be feared chiefly, when the wives have plots, for
the raising of their own children; or else that they
be advoutresses.
For their children; the tragedies likewise of
dangers from them, have been many. And gen-
erally, the entering of fathers into suspicion of
their children, hath been ever unfortunate. The
destruction of Mustapha (that we named before)
was so fatal to Solyman's line, as the succession of
the Turks, from Solyman until this day, is sus-
pected to be untrue, and of strange blood; for that
Selymus the Second, was thought to be supposi-
tious. The destruction of Crispus, a young prince of
rare towardness, by Constantinus the Great, his
father, was in like manner fatal to his house; for
both Constantinus and Constance, his sons, died
violent deaths; and Constantius, his other son, did
little better; who died indeed of sickness, but after
that Julianus had taken arms against him. The de-
struction of Demetrius, son to Philip the Second of
Macedon, turned upon the father, who died of
repentance. And many like examples there are;
but few or none, where the fathers had good by
such distrust; except it were, where the sons were
up in open arms against them; as was Selymus the
First against Bajazet; and the three sons of Henry
the Second, King of England.
For their prelates; when they are proud and
great, there is also danger from them; as it was in
the times of Anselmus, and Thomas Becket, Arch-
bishops of Canterbury; who, with their croziers,
did almost try it with the king's sword; and yet
they had to deal with stout and haughty kings,
William Rufus, Henry the First, and Henry the
Second. The danger is not from that state, but
where it hath a dependence of foreign authority;
or where the churchmen come in and are elected,
not by the collation of the king, or particular
patrons, but by the people.
For their nobles; to keep them at a distance, it is
not amiss; but to depress them, may make a king
more absolute, but less safe; and less able to per-
form, any thing that he desires. I have noted it, in
my History of King Henry the Seventh of Eng-
land, who depressed bis nobility; whereupon it
came to pass, that his times were full of difficulties
and troubles; for the nobility, though they con-
tinued loyal unto him, yet did they not co-operate
with him in his business. So that in effect, he was
fain to do all things himself.
For their second-nobles; there is not much dan-
ger from them, being a body dispersed. They may
sometimes discourse high, but that doth little hurt;
besides, they are a counterpoise to the higher no-
bility, that they grow not too potent; and, lastly,
being the most immediate in authority, with the
common people, they do best temper popular com-
motions.
For their merchants; they are vena porta; and
if they flourish not, a kingdom may have good
limbs, but will have empty veins, and nourish
little. Taxes and imposts upon them, do seldom
good to the king's revenue; for that that he wins in
the hundred, he leeseth in the shire; the particular
rates being increased, but the total bulk of trading,
rather decreased.
For their commons; there is little danger from
them, except it be, where they have great and po-
tent heads; or where you meddle with the point of
religion, or their customs, or means of life.
For their men of war; it is a dangerous state,
where they live and remain in a body, and are
used to donatives; whereof we see examples in the
janizaries, and pretorian bands of Rome; but train-
ings of men, and arming them in several places,
and under several commanders, and without
donatives, are things of defence, and no danger.
Princes are like to heavenly bodies, which cause
good or evil times; and which have much venera-
tion, but no rest. All precepts concerning kings,
are in effect comprehended in those two remem-
brances: memento quod es homo; and memento
quod es Deus, or vice Dei; the one bridleth their
power, and the other their will.
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